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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1 . 1 Introduction
Each day we try to understand other people's behavior.
Typically we are not even aware of this process, but if we
are asked, we can easily explain the cause of another
person's actions. We construct such explanations even
though we lack omnipotent sight into the person's
personality or the true impact of the situation on their
behavior. This act of attributing a cause to a person's
behavior is known as making an attribution. Attributions
are a way people understand and eventually predict the
behavior of others.
A biased attribution can often be an event of little
significance. At times though, our predisposition for
making certain kinds of attributions can lead us to make
poor and unfair decisions concerning others and potentially
even lead to acts of discrimination. Understanding how
attributions can be biased or incorrect can help us avoid
misunderstandings and potentially help us gain a more
accurate view of the world.
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Attributions are the result of a multistage process.
According to the most basic model (Gilbert, Pelhan and Krull
1988), the first stage is when the behavior is categorized.
First, we see the behavior and interpret it. The second
stage involves a relative automatic association of the
behavior with the person's disposition. A person acting
anxious is seen as an anxious person. Finally, if we have
the cognitive resources and motivation, we may correct that
initial dispositional attribution for mitigating information
about the situation. The person may be seen as less of an
anxious individual in general when we acknowledge he or she
is speaking to a large audience.
There are two interesting interpretations that follow
from this model. The first is that the only time that we
use the situation to explain someone's behavior is when we
are sufficiently able and motivated to do so. The second is
that if we deprive people of resources, we can trick them
into making a dispositional attribution regardless of their
previous image of the actor. This would be particularly
useful if we wished to force someone into making a positive
attribution about a person in a stereotyped group. However,
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when we dig deeper into the theories that form the backdrop
of the process of making an attribution, it appears this may
not be that easy.
Gilbert, Pelham and Krull (1988) cite Quattrone (1982)
as providing the basis for their model. Quattrone 's model
in turn builds on one of the basic concepts underlying many
attribution theories which was derived from Heider
' s (1944,
1958) initial analysis of the phenomenon. This basic
concept is that when perceivers see a person perform a
behavior, the person and the act typically are seen as
forming a causal unit and the perceiver responds with a
dispositionally-biased attribution
.
Thus, one possible unit is between the act and the
actor. This particular unit should occur frequently due to
the close temporal and spatial proximity of the act to the
actor. The act-actor unit is also theorized to be a common
unit formation due to a general attribut ional set of
perceivers in Western culture to perceive the actor as the
origin of the act. Cross-cultural work has achieved some
success in demonstrating that in other cultures the bias is
towards grouping the act with the situation rather than the
actor, suggesting some other cultures may have, in general.
3
a situationally biased attribution set (Fletcher, & Ward,
1988)
.
A third relevant factor taken from Heider involves
the perceived similarity of the actor to the act. Act-actor
units are more likely to occur when the act is similar to
the perceiver's preconception of the actor.
The possibility raised by Heider that such
attributional sets or expectations could result in a
situation-behavior unit rather than actor-behavior unit was
one of the cornerstones of the anchor-adjustment theory of
attributional processing (Quattrone, 1982). The perceiver
begins with an evaluation of the behavior, and then this
evaluation of the behavior is used as an anchor for an
estimate of either the actor's disposition or the situation,
depending on which causal unit is formed. After the
behavior is used to anchor the estimate, the perceiver
adjusts this initial estimate for additional information in
the final step.
An elaboration of Gilbert's basic model by Krull (1993)
reintroduces the concept from Quattrone 's model that the
situation and behavior can form the initial unit. He
suggests that while our society tends to have a default bias
towards dispositional attributions, it is also possible for
4
people to follow an alternative process where the
situational attribution is made first, and is then followed
by a dispositional correction.
In Krull's mixed model, outlined in Figure 1, the first
step for both processes is the same as in the three-step
model, categorization. However, the second step depends on
whether a dispositional or situational goal has been
triggered. The third step is now either a dispositional or
situational correction, respectively.
The new part of Krull's model involves the addition of
the situational goal process. After the behavior is
categorized, it is paired with the situation. Only later are
these attributions corrected due to deeper processing of the
person's behavior.
5
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Figure 1. Krull's Mixed Model
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In order to induce the different goals, Krull
manipulated which process participants followed by simply
giving them different explicit attributional goals. He
activated a dispositional goal by telling the observers that
their task was to evaluate the person. To give observers a
situational goal, the participants were told their task was
to evaluate how much anxiety the interviewer's questions
would provoke.
While this gives us an indication of how observers can
react differently when they enter the attributional process
with different goals, the question remains what naturalistic
factors could trigger the activation of these different
processes, especially factors inherent in the target person.
It is predicted that one possible trigger that could
cause a situational goal to be initiated, outside of an
explicit goal manipulation, relates to stereotype
activation. The first two stages of the attributional
process are thought to occur almost automatically, so
anything that could have an impact on the initial steps of
the attribution process would also have to be relatively
automatic. Most research suggests that stereotypes are very
easy to activate, and can be activated by stimuli that last
7
less than a second, (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler,
1986; McCrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994), which is less
time than the observed act takes to be completed, let alone
processed. Assuming that stereotype information can be
activated relatively automatically, stereotypes would likely
play a role in which process is activated.
The proposed model is depicted in Figure 2. The first
stage of behavior categorization has been expanded to
include simultaneous, automatic stereotype activation.
When group membership is easily identified, a
stereotype may be activated which contains certain
assumptions and expectations about the person's disposition.
After the stereotype has been activated and the behavior
has been categorized, these two components are brought
together in the next stage in an attempt to form a causal
unit. This comparison stage is theorized to be still
relatively automatic. If the two components are congruent,
in other words they activate the same concepts on the
relevant dimension, then the dispositional-f irst
attributional process is followed and an act-actor causal
unit is formed. Likewise, when the stereotype is irrelevant
to the behavior, or there just is no stereotype, the general
8
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cultural attributional set towards dispositional
explanations will result in an act-actor causal unit and a
dispositional-f irst process.
However, when the behavior is inconsistent with the
expectancy, a situational-f irst attributional process will
be activated. When the act and the actor do not fit
together, the observer experiences shock, disbelief and
quickly turns to the situation as a probable cause.
Another aspect of the mixed model (Krull, 1993) that
remains to be tested involves a full test of what occurs
during the first stage of the situational-f irst attribution
process. Unfortunately, Krull only explored the cases where
the situation was a probable cause of the actor's behavior.
He did not include conditions in which the situation was not
the probable cause of the behavior. Essentially,
participants in his study only saw a person who acted
anxious in response to interview questions likely to cause
anxiety, but not a person acting anxious in response to a
set of interview questions that would be unlikely to produce
anxiety. Since the situational information was uniform,
there is no way to judge if the situational information was
being evaluated as a causal source, or was just assumed to
10
be a causal source. The participants rated the situation as
highly causal, but the question remains if they would still
rate the situation as highly causal if it were not a likely
cause of the behavior.
Krull (1993) does discuss this issue to some extent and
concludes that while in a normal dispositional-f irst process
the person is the initial focus of evaluation, in a
situational-f irst process, it is the situation that is
evaluated first. This would lead us to the prediction that
observers who are following a situational-f irst process and
see a person acting anxious in response to anxiety producing
questions will rate the situation as highly anxiety
producing. They will use the congruity between the act and
the situation to conclude that the actor's disposition is
the same as the initial stereotype implied. Observers
following the same stereotype driven, situational-f irst
process who see a person acting anxious in response to non-
anxiety questions will rate the situation as not highly
anxiety producing. This group will use this incongruity
between the act and the situation to conclude that the actor
must be different from his or her stereotype group and make
a hasty dispositional attribution.
11
After the situation has been assessed, given time and
resources, the final stage of the situational-f irst process
would be the dispositional correction stage. The concept of
a dispositional correction is still unexplored. In the
dispositional-first process, the observer's attention turns
towards the situation. In the case where the behavioral
expectation is due to a stereotype, a dispositional
correction involves the observer's attention turning
primarily towards the disposition. This is especially true
when the previous stage has resulted in a dispositional
attribution. After all, there is still some tension left
over from the lack of fit between the stereotype and the
behavior. In this case, when the situation was implausible,
the actor is sub-typed into a category that allows the
behavior in order to preserve the overall stereotype ( Fiske &
Neuberg 1986) .
So we have a prediction for the case when the situation
is implausible
. The case for when the situation is not
plausible is somewhat more complex since at this point both
the individual and the situation have been rejected as easy
possibilities. If the situation is also implausible, the
observer makes a hasty individuation of the actor, and
12
decides that they are unlike their stereotyped group. The
dispositional correction would be a motivated response to
restore the stereotype and disregard the behavior.
In order to demonstrate the second and third stages of
the attributional process, both the three-step model and the
mixed model use a cognitive load to freeze participants at
the second stage while non-cognitively loaded participants
are seen as being able to reach the final, correction stage.
The two ingredients required for observers to reach the
final stage are cognitive resources and motivation. Thus,
all participants are asked to try to come up with the most
accurate assessment of the actor's personality. This
results in several counter-intuitive responses. If people
are following a dispositional-f irst process, in real life
they would tend to stop at the second stage. That anxiously
behaving person is anxious. However, the motivation to be
accurate and the knowledge that others will be observing
their decisions pressures them to consider the situation in
the third stage. Likewise, for participants following the
situation-first process, we expect for people to strive to
be accurate by determining in the third stage that it is
13
possible that that the anxious acting person really is
anxious despite the situation.
1 2 Summary and General Predictions
One purpose of this study is to replicate previous
research to provide further evidence of the nature of
attributional processes and also to demonstrate that this
study is addressing the same phenomenon. A second purpose
is to extend Krull and determine if the situational-f irst
process involves an assessment of the situation as a cause
or whether the situation is merely assumed to be the cause.
A third purpose is to demonstrate that the situation-first
process can be triggered by something outside of direct
attributional goal manipulation. The final purpose is to
explore the process of dispositional correction.
It is predicted that an observer's stereotype
(behavioral expectation) about a person can determine
whether the situation is initially considered or not when
the observer is deciding what caused this person to perform
a particular behavior. The purpose of the present study is
to demonstrate that congruence or incongruence between
activated stereotypes and observed behavior can lead to
different attributional processes.
14
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With this in mind, to test whether stereotype-behavic
congruency or incongruency can affect the attr ibut ional
process, two actors were selected so that stereotypes would
prompt different expectation concerning the target behavior
(anger)
.
Expectations for the target behavior were either
congruent with the actual behavior (African-American actor),
or incongruent (Asian-American actor) according to a
pretest. A second factor involves a cognitive load task
that is used to deny the required additional resources of
half of the observers in order to assess what type of
attributions they made before the correction stage. Finally,
a third factor is a situational plausibility manipulation
that included questions that could either plausibly provoke
anger in the average person, or were neutral and thus
implausible causes of anger. The situation implausible
condition is of special interest because it helps us
determine if participants are actually assessing the
situation to some degree in the first stage rather than just
assuming it is anger provoking.
To determine if participants were following a
dispositional-f irst or situational-f irst process it is
necessary to compare cognitively busy conditions. If they
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show no difference in their ratings despite viewing a
different situation, then they are using a dispositional-
first process. if they do use situational information
despite being cognitively loaded and rate the person and the
situation differently depending on the situation, then they
are using a situational-f irst process.
Third stage corrections can be seen by comparing
cognitively busy participants to their non-cognitively busy
counterparts who have been exposed to the same situation
information. If the means differ, then additional
situational, behavioral or dispositional information has
been considered. For dispositional-f irst processes,
corrections are only expected when the situation was a
plausible cause of the behavior.
Dispositional corrections found in situational-f irst
processes are expected to be more complex. In the case
where the situation was plausible, it would initially be
seen as the cause. A dispositional correction in this case
would take the form of revising your perception of the actor
either to a sub-stereotype or individuating the actor so
that it is possible to view the actor's behavior being a
cause of the behavior. If the situation was not a plausible
16
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cause, then the observer would have to assume the
disposition was the cause without the opportunity of tc
much consideration of the behavioral information. A
dispositional correction would involve restoring the
stereotype and discounting the behavioral information.
1 . 3 Specific Predictions
It is expected that because of the content of the
relevant stereotypes, cogni t ively-busy observers of an
African-American actor will respond with a disposi tional-
first bias, while cognitively-busy observers of an Asian-
American actor will respond with a situational-f irst bias.
Thus, cognitively-busy participants who are exposed to an
African-American actor are expected to rate the actor the
same, regardless of the situation, while cognitively-busy
participants who are exposed to the Asian-American actor are
expected to attempt to pair the behavior with the situation
and rate the actor as more angry when the situation is not a
plausible causal source.
In contrast to the cognitively-busy conditions, non-
cognit ively-busy observers of African-American are expected
to adjust, or correct, their initial attributions, depending
on the plausibility of the situation. When questions are
17
anger provoking, observers of the African-American actors
are expected to rate the actor as less dispositionally
angry
.
On the other hand, non-cognit ively-busy observers of
the Asian-American actor are expected to re-evaluate only
the dispositional dimension of their attributions. When the
situation is plausible, the dispositional correction results
in sub-typing and a dispositional attribution is made. When
the situation is implausible, the dispositional correction
is expected to result in a moderation of the initial
attribution
.
18
CHAPTER 2
METHOD
2 . 1 Overview
Participants were exposed to one of two actors of
different races in order to activate different stereotypic
expectations before they read a transcript of an interview
supposedly conducted earlier with the actor. Half the
participants were depleted of cognitive resources by being
told that they should underline, count, and memorize the
hesitations of both the person interviewed and the
interviewer
.
Because employing two different actors could create a
potential confound in that the actors could actually be
behaving differently, it was necessary to control for this
possibility. Consequently, observers were only shown a
brief 5-second video clip of the actor, who was simply
sitting in a chair, filling out a short questionnaire. Th
video clip was shown under the pretext of obtaining the
actor's transcript number. Once the number appeared, the
monitor was turned off, and the participants were handed a
transcript in which the actor behaved identically in all
conditions
.
19
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In five of the eight quest ion-and-answer segments ii
the transcript, the person who was interviewed responded to
each question in a neutral fashion. However, in three of
the segments, the person who was interviewed responded in an
angry fashion. Half of the participants read interview
questions preceding the angry segments that were pretested
to be neutral. The other participants read interview
questions preceding the angry response segments that were
pretested to be anger provoking.
After reading the transcript, the participants were
asked to rate the actor on both how angry they thought he
would be in general, as a measure of the degree of his
dispositional anger, and also how angry these questions
would make the average person, as a measure of the degree of
his situational anger. The participants were next asked to
recall the number of hesitations in the transcript, and what
the actor looked like. Finally, everyone was probed for
suspicion and thoroughly debriefed.
2 . 2 Participants
The participants were 126 students at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst who participated for extra credit
in psychology courses. The racial breakdown of the
20
participants revealed that 88 percent were Caucasian-
American. Because subsequent analysis showed that there was
no difference in the results according to racial background,
all participants, regardless of race, were included in the
analysis. The participant's gender also did not have an
effect on the results; 85 participants were female, 41 were
male
.
2 . 3 Behavior and Actor Selection
To choose the stereotyped behavior and relevant actors,
a pilot study was conducted in which participants
(predominantly Caucasian-American) were given a free
response task and asked to list what they believed were
common stereotypes of people from various races. The major
finding from these data was the existence of a clear
stereotype that African-Americans tend to be angry, while
Asian-Americans were seen as being polite. This finding
implied that the behavior of anger would be a useful target
behavior to use since different groups prompted different
stereotypic expectations on this dimension. In order to
activate these stereotypes in the study, participants were
shown one of two actors in a brief video clip, followed by a
transcript where the actor demonstrated angry behavior. The
21
first of the two actors was an African-American. It was
expected the African-American actor to elicit an expectation
of angry behavior, which would result in a bias towards
attributing the anger he displayed to his disposition.
The second actor was an Asian-American. However,
because the nature of the Asian-American stereotype, it was
not expected that the same bias towards a dispositional-
first attribution would occur here. Instead, it was
expected that a situational-f irst bias would occur.
2 . 4 Initial Instructions
Before the participants arrived at the laboratory, they
were randomly assigned to one of twelve conditions. On
arrival at the laboratory, participants were greeted by a
male experimenter who gave a brief introduction to the
experiment, and provided them with an informed consent form.
The initial instructions stated that the participants would
be acting as coders for the experimenter. A (non-existent)
previous study was described where athletes and academics
have been asked a series of questions. These questions were
described to all of the participants as ranging from being
neutral to being designed to provoke a great deal of
emotion
.
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Next, they were told that because a large number of
people were interviewed for over an hour, each participant
would only see eight samples from one person in order to
keep from overloading anyone. It was stated that what was
being examined was the difference in emotionality between
people who do well in athletics, compared with academics.
This cover story was designed to reduce suspicion when
viewing different races in the videotape. It was expected
the participants would not be surprised to see people of
different races after hearing this cover story, based on the
finding from the pilot study that some other common
stereotypes are that African-Americans do well in athletics,
and that Asian-Americans do well in academics.
It was also mentioned in the initial instructions that
the study was examining differences in emotion displayed
with body language, compared to emotion displayed through
the voice cues or emotion displayed through word choice. At
this point, the experimenter announced he would be rolling a
die supposedly to determine whether the participants watched
the video for body language cues, listening to the tape for
voice cues, or reading a transcript for word choice cues to
determine the amount of emotion displayed in the interview.
23
After the die roll, all participants were informed they
would be reading a transcript and were given brief
"training" on how to evaluate a transcript. The training
consisted of three basic techniques to assess the amount of
emotion in a transcript. One method was described as
recreating the interview by picking voices for the
interviewer and the person interviewed. A second method
suggested searching for certain emotion-laden adjectives,
adverbs or curse words. The third method concerned watching
for hesitations, which could be useful in detecting the
degree of emotion. This final method was mentioned only
briefly for the non-cognitive load conditions, and was used
as an introduction for the cognitive load counting task in
the other conditions.
2 . 5 Cognitive Resource Depletion
During the brief training on how to evaluate the
transcript, all participants were informed that a useful cue
to use in judging how much emotion is being expressed is to
pay attention to the number of hesitations by the person
interviewed, as well as the number of hesitations by the
supposedly unrehearsed, naive student interviewer. It was
24
explained that people hesitate when they are feeling a great
deal of emotion and are searching for the best words to
express themselves, and in addition, the interviewer might
be hesitating in reaction to a strong display of emotion by
the person he or she was interviewing.
Participants in the cognitive busyness condition were
told part of their task consisted of underlining, counting
and memorizing the number of hesitations of both the
interviewer and the person interviewed in the transcript.
Immediately after they finished the transcript, they were
given a questionnaire. In order to prevent them from
completing the third stage of the attribut ional process
during the brief wait, they were asked to rehearse the
numbers of hesitations until we reached them with a
questionnaire so that they did not forget the number in the
brief interlude.
2 . 6 Stereotype Activation Manipulation
After the participants were given a brief training on
how to evaluate a transcript, the experimenter started the
videotape, which featured either an African-American, or an
Asian-American sitting in a chair. As if he was simply
trying to fill the silence, the experimenter off-handedly
25
mentioned that the person in the videotape was the person
the participant would be evaluating. The experimenter then
explained that he needed to get the identification number
for the transcript of person in the videotape. Once the
number appeared on the video screen, the experimenter
stopped the tape, wrote down the number and selected the
appropriate transcript from a file box.
In addition to the manipulation of the brief video
clip, which identified the race of the stimulus person, the
transcript had either the name "Jamaal" or "Xiang" on the
front page above a fictitious participant number and
interview date. The use of these names was meant to
reinforce the apparent race of the stimulus person (either
African-American or Asian-American, respectively)
.
2 . 7 Plausibility Manipulation
The participants were told that the questions were pre-
selected to either be neutral or provoke varying degrees of
emotion. These questions were then supposedly administered
to the target person by naive interviewers who were
participants like themselves. Two transcripts were
constructed and contained eight questions and answers, with
one question-and-answer per page. The answer sections were
26
identical in both transcripts, and included five neutral
responses and three angry responses. The questions were the
same in the two transcripts, except for the questions
preceding the angry responses. For the situation-plausible
condition, the three key questions were ones that were pre-
tested to be anger provoking, or were seen as likely to
provoke an angry response. For the situation- implausible
(disposition-plausible) condition, the three key questions
were pre-tested to be neutral, and were not seen as likely
to provoke an angry response.
The questions covered the same topics. The anger
provoking questions were: " Have you ever betrayed a close
friend , " " I'd like you to describe someone you hate " and,
" Tell me about a mistake you made recently, and why you
didn't prevent it . " The corresponding neutral questions
were, " What are you relationships with your best friend
like, " " I'd like you to describe some other people who are
important to you " and, " Tell me about something you've done
recently .
"
Following exposure to the transcript, participants
completed the dependent measures
.
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2-8 Dependent Measure: Dispositional Anger
Participants were asked to rate how emotional they
thought the person interviewed would be, in general, on a
group of six scales. These six scales consisted of 11-point
scales anchored with the phrases very little and very much
.
Above each scale was one of the following emotions: sad,
angry, relaxed
,
happy, anxious, and pleasant
. Only the
angry scale was of interest, the others were fillers.
2 . 9 Manipulation Check
Participants were asked to recall the actor's gender,
race, and hair color to insure that they noticed the person
in the videotape.
28
CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
3 . 1 Manipulation Check
All but eight participants correctly remembered the
race of the actor from the videotape. The eight who could
not recall the actor's race were excluded from all analyses.
3 . 2 Dependent Variables
A multivariate analysis of variance with a 2 (cognitive
load) X 2 (plausibility) x 2 (stereotype group) design was
performed on both of the dependent variables, ratings of the
actor's dispositional anger and ratings of how anger
provoking the situation was. A main effect for plausibility
was found, F (2,110) = 12.125, p < .001, suggesting that
across all 8 conditions there was a tendency to take the
situation into account. Overall, the plausible situation
was rated as more anger provoking with a mean of 5.1 versus
the average implausible situation rating of 3.338. This was
qualified, however, by both a two-way interaction between
cognitive load and plausibility, F (2,110)= 3.836, p = .025,
and a three-way interaction, F(2,110) = 6.011, p = .003.
29
Duncan pairwise comparisons were performed on the
means and the results are summarized in Table 1 and
presented graphically in Figure 3.
3 • 3 Post-hoc Pairwise Comparison s
Comparisons between the cognitively busy conditions
where the question was plausible or implausible should
theoretically determine if participants were taking the
situation into account when they made their attributions.
As expected, there was no difference for cognitively busy
participants who saw an African-American, suggesting that
they had not been able to take the situation into account.
However also as predicted, there was a significant
difference for cognitively busy participants who saw an
Asian-American actor, suggesting these participants did
take the situation into account when making their
attributions. When the situation was plausible,
participants rated the actor's disposition as less angry at
5.69 versus 7.23 when the situation was an implausible.
Ratings of the situation demonstrated a trend towards
significance with a p < .10. When the situation was
plausible, participants rated the anger provocation
30
Table 1. Results
Means and Pairwise Comparisons
African-American Actor Grouos
Cognitive Ta^k ti Question Plausibility ## Rating of Actor ### Rating of Situation ####
Cognitiveiy Busy Situation was Plausible 7.31 a- 4.3 1 ab-
Situation was Not Plausible 7.33 a- 3.71 a-c-
Not Cognitiveiy Busy Situation was Plausible 6.00
-be 6.06 —
d
Situation was Not Plausible 7.00 a-c 2.64
-c-
Asian-American Actor Groups
Cognitive Task Question Plausibility Rating of Actor Rating of Situation
Cognitiveiy Busy Situation was Plausible 5.69 -b- 4.63 ab-d*
Situation was Not Plausible 7.23 a- 3.23 a-c-*
Not Cognitiveiy Busy Situation was Plausible 6.87 a-c 5.40 -b-d
Situation was Not Plausible 5.94 -be 3.56 a-c-
# = Cognitive Task was manipulated by having participants count hesitations in the question and
answer. The two Cognitiveiy Busy groups should not differ when participants are following a
dispositional-first process. If they do differ, a situational-first process is being followed.
## - Question Plausibility was manipulated by changing the questions preceding the angry
responses. Situation was Plausible means that the questions were perceived by participants to be
anger provoking in a pilot study.
### = Rating of Actor was the participant's rating of the dispositional anger of the actor. Ratings
ranged from 0, very little anger to 10, a lot of anger. Means with the same subscript did not differ
significantly, (p < .05).
#### = Rating of the Situation was the participant's rating of the degree that the situation was
considered to be anger provoking with 0 meaning not very anger provoking and 10 meaning very
anger provoking.
* = Means that both have a '*' demonstrate a trend towards differing with a 2 < • 10.
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IRating of the Actor and the Question
1
8
African- African- Asian-American Asian-American
American Cog American Non- Cog Busy Non-Cog Busy
Busy Cog Busy
Stereotype Group
[Actor - Situation Plausible HActor - Situation Implausible
[Questions - Situation Plausible DQuestions - Situation Implausible
Figure 3. Results
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of the question at 4.63, while when it was not plausible
their ratings dropped 1.4 to 3.23.
A second theoretically interesting type of pairwise
comparison involves whether non-cogni t ively busy
participants rated the actor's disposition or the situation
in a similar manner as their cognitively busy counterparts.
Cognitively busy participants are viewed as being frozen
in the first stage of the attribution process, while non-
cognitively busy participants are seen as being in the
second stage. If the participants rate the actor
differently when they are not cognitively loaded, this
difference is seen as a correction for information that was
not used when the participants were cognitively loaded
(Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988) .
For participants who saw an African-American actor,
the dispositional-f irst correction for the situation was
replicated on both scales for the situation plausible
groups. Non-cogni tively busy participants rated the actor
as less angry than the cognitively busy participants with a
mean of 6.00 versus 7.33, and they rated the questions as
more anger provoking with a mean of 6.06 versus 3.71. It
appears participants who were not cognitively busy were
able to take the situation into account.
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For participants who saw an Asian-American actor, what
appears to be a dispositional correction was found for both
situation plausible and implausible groups. When the
situation was plausible, cognitively busy participants
rated the actor as less angry with a mean of 5.69 versus
the non-cognitive busy participants who made a correction
and gave a higher average rating of 6.87. When the
situation was not plausible the pattern was the opposite,
where participants who were cognitively busy rated the
actor as more angry with a mean of 7.23 while non-
cognitively busy participants only rated the actor at 5.94.
The other Asian-American actor mean pairs did differ
somewhat, although the difference was not significant due
to a large standard deviation. While corrections for the
actor's disposition were expected in these mean pairs, the
exact direction was not specified. Some possible
interpretations of these finding are discussed in the next
section
.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
4 . 1 General
The basic model underlying this experiment was that
congruency between expectations and observed behavior can
determine whether people will follow a situational-f irst or
dispositional-first attributional process. A quick look at
the results confirms that the pattern of responses was
markedly different for each stereotype condition. When
people observe a person behaving in a way that is congruent
with their expectations, a dispositional-first process is
followed where the behavior is first assumed to reflect the
actor's disposition. The alternative mode of attributional
processing is where the behavior contradicts the observer's
expectations, and the observer follows a situational-f irst
attribution process where the situation is relatively
automatically considered as a plausible cause of the
behavior
.
The African-American actor groups were used to
demonstrate the dispositional-first attributional process.
These groups theoretically experienced little discrepancy
between expectations and observed behavior, and rated the
actor as equally disposit ionally angry when cognitively
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busy regardless of the situation. They only corrected for
the situation when they had the cognitive resources
available
.
The Asian-American groups were used to demonstrate the
situational-first process. They theoretically experienced
a much greater discrepancy between expectations and
observed behavior. The cognitively busy groups responded
as predicted by making different evaluations of the actor,
and to a lesser extent of the situation. In general, this
finding implies that when a behavior is incongruent with
our expectations, we are reluctant to re-evaluate our
beliefs concerning the person who committed the behavior
and instead will first scrutinize the situation for a
possible explanation.
4.2 Previous Attribution Process Research
For the purposes of comparison to previous research on
the nature of attribut ional processes, the African-American
condition replicated the dispositional-f irst process
outlined by Gilbert, Pelham and Krull (1988) . This is
encouraging in that it suggests that these paradigms are
addressing the same underlying phenomenon.
Another replication was of Krull's (1993) results,
while at the same time his findings were also extended. In
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his original study, he only used conditions where the
situational was a plausible cause of the behavior. This
study also included conditions where the situation was not
a plausible cause to answer the question whether the
situation was assumed as the cause, or if cognitively
loaded participants were actually assessing the situation
as a cause. The difference between the Asian-American,
cognitively busy participants that read anger provoking or
neutral questions suggests that in a si tuational-f irst
process, the situation is assessed, not assumed as the
probable cause.
Thus, this model can be superficially interpreted as
implying that the dispositional-f irst and situational-f irst
processes are mirror images of one another. However, there
is one key difference: A dispositional-f irst attribution
means that the degree of attribution will be a function of
the degree of the behavior displayed due to the fact that
when we ignore the situation, the disposition can
practically always be a plausible explanation. Yet, given
the initial behavior, the situation cannot always be a
plausible explanation. Thus a situation-first process
results in a situational attribution only to the extent
that the situation is a plausible cause. Since the
37
situation is not always a plausible cause, the processes
are similar, but not identical.
4 . 3 General Attribution Research
Interpreting the ultimate attribution error
(Pettigrew, 1979) and intergroup attribution research
(Hewstone, 1990) findings with this revised model presents
us with a somewhat more complex picture. It is now
necessary to divide this body of research into two types.
The first case would be where group membership of an actor
is not known initially. In this case, the end result, in-
group enhancing and out-group derogating attributions,
would be the result of a motivated correction in accord
with Gilbert, Pelham and Krull's (1988) original theory.
However, in the second case, when the group membership
of the actor is known beforehand, the model proposed here
would suggest that a stereotype would be activated, and the
actor's behavior is then compared to the stereotype. From
this point on, which attribution process is followed would
be a function of whether or not the behavior was congruent
with the stereotype. When the stereotype is congruent with
the observed behavior, a dispositional-f irst bias would be
activated. However, when the stereotype was incongruent, a
situational-f irst bias would be activated. Motivation
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could still play a role in the correction stages, although
the effect of different groups and related stereotypes is
likely not as clear- cut as previously thought.
4.4 Future Directions
One central issue left unexamined is the nature of a
dispositional correction. Here, a dispositional correction
has been described as a correction where the observer
considers in more depth what they know of the actor.
Future research could confirm this in one of two ways.
First, by varying the amount of information the participant
has concerning the actor and thus varying the
sophistication of the observer's expectations. The second
method could remain in the realm of stereotyping and
comparing observers with rigid superficial stereotypes
versus observers with a rich variety of sub-stereotypes.
A second issue is that while the situation and the
disposition are reconsidered, no model takes into account
the. possibility of the behavior itself being reconsidered.
Another third that could be expanded on in the future
involves the issue of motivation. In this study, a
cognitive load task was used that was intentionally
ambiguous to increase the plausibility of the cover story.
A cognitive load task that was less ambiguous would allow
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a more detailed evaluation of whether or not cognitively
loaded participants who were exposed to an actor whose
behavior was incongruent with the observer's expectation
responded by actually completing the first stage then
allocating more resources to the attribution process while
allowing their performance on the cognitive load task to
suffer. The motivation hypothesis is one main alternative
hypothesis to the one presented in this paper. However,
the motivation hypothesis suffers from the fact that it
does not predict the observed corrections found in the
Asian-American, non-cogni t ively busy conditions, and more
specifically does not predict that these corrections would
be dispositional in nature. Still, an addition of a more
concrete cognitive load task would help resolve this
dilemma
.
A final issue that could be explored more in future
research is related to the concept of familiarity. One
potential confound of the current research is that it is
possible that participants were more familiar with African-
Americans and related stereotypes than they were with
Asian-Americans. Thus, it would not be a congruency or
incongruency between expectations and behavior that
triggered the observed processes, but rather the lack of
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familiarity with Asian-Americans that resulted in the
initial apparent scrutiny of situational information.
Since familiarity of stereotypes is likely to always be a
real life confound, it would be necessary to create
behavioral expectations for a target person that would
equally familiar to rule out this possibility. It is
important to note, however, that this alternative
possibility would still imply that our expectations are
based on stereotypes related to race. Otherwise
participants would have been equally unfamiliar with all
three actors used in this study.
4.5 Conclusions
This research demonstrated that, in the process of
person perception, stereotypes and expectations can
determine whether we first attend to the situation or not
when we are deciding why a person is acting a particular
way. People who are involved in many tasks at once would
be especially susceptible to fail to correct their initial
expectations of another person's behavior by not having the
cognitive resources to attend to situational constraints on
the other individual.
Unfortunately, this suggests decision makers who are
overtaxed and are confronted with someone they expect to
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behave in a negative fashion will frequently neglect
situational information in their rush to make a decision.
When this person fails, he or she will be perceived as a
failure, and an alternative, situational explanation will
not be sought out. Likewise, people who are expected to
succeed will be seen as a success even if most people would
have succeeded in that situation. Frequently, only when
people who are expected to fail manage to succeed, or those
who are expected to succeed somehow fail, will most
perceivers attend to the possible situational causes.
Since often in real life the situation will be ambiguous
enough that a possible cause for the unexpected success or
failure can be found, the research presented here implies
yet another way stereotypes can be reinforced and
maintained in everyday life.
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